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convicted of a crime other than the one for which he was indicted.1 57
The Iannone Court's admonition to the lower courts to safeguard
defendants' rights through use of discovery and the bill of particulars does not appear to adequately resolve the above problems.'5 8
John F. Finston

CPL § 220.60(3): Defendant denied full evidentiary hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea where court record contains no indication of unfulfilled out-of-court promise
Section 220.60(3) of the CPL provides that a criminal defendant may, in the discretion of the court, withdraw a guilty plea prior
to the imposition of sentence.'59 The reluctance to exercise this dis157See

note 146 supra.
45 N.Y.2d at 599-600, 384 N.E.2d at-663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117. Although the defendants in lannone did not assert actual prejudice, the Court noted that, where this occurs
because of the paucity of information in an indictment and the defendant is actually unaware
of the crime with which he is charged, a conviction might not be sustained. Id. In such a case,
reviewability of the indictment may be necessary to ensure a fair opportunity for the defendant to prepare a defense.
'i' CPL § 220.60(3) (Supp. 1978-1979) states that:
At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court in its discretion may
permit a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to the entire indictment or to
part of the indictment to withdraw such plea, and in such event the entire indictment, as it existed at the time of the plea of guilty, is restored.
Plea negotiations often have been categorized in two groups. In "charge bargaining" the
prosecutor may offer the defendant a reduced charge, with its concomitant lesser sentence,
in exchange for a plea of guilty. A variation on this method is the offer to dismiss some of
the charges against the defendant or to forego additional charges which might validly be
made. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971). In contrast, "sentence bargaining" involves an agreement by the prosecutor to
recommend a particular disposition to the sentencing court after the defendant has pleaded
guilty to the offense as originally charged. See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d
784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Berger, The Case Against
Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621, 621 (1976); Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal from a
Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 663, 664-65 (1974).
By entering a plea, a defendant waives certain constitutional guarantees, see Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927), including the right against selfincrimination, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964), to trial by jury, see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), to confront and cross-examine witnesses of the state,
see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), to compel the presence of witnesses on his
behalf, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967), to require the government to
prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and to
have only constitutionally obtained evidence used as part of the prosecution's case, see,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The right to plea bargain, however, is not a constitutional right, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), and not all constitutional rights
'5'
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cretion 65 or grant full hearings on motions to withdraw such pleas' 6 '
reflects the courts' desire to maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process and bring a measure of finality to dispositions following guilty pleas.' 2 Thus, agreements made off the record generare waived by a plea of guilty, Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional
Rights: The Current Price of PleadingGuilty, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1265, 1266 (1978); see, e.g.,
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam) (right against double jeopardy); cf.
People v. Jackson, 60 App. Div. 2d 893, 893, 401 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (2d Dep't 1978) (guilty
plea waives nonjurisdictional defects but not jurisdictional ones). See generally Note, The
Waivability by Guilty Plea of Retroactively Endowed Constitutional Rights, 41 ALB. L.
REV. 115 (1977); Note, The Guilty Plea As a Waiver of "PresentBut Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1974).
"I See People v. McKennion, 27 N.Y.2d 671, 261 N.E.2d 910, 313 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970);
People v. DeCrescente, 64 App. Div. 2d 746, 406 N.Y.S.2d 933 (3d Dep't 1978); People v.
Hicks, 63 App. Div. 2d 1032, 407 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1978); People v. Thompson, 60 App.
Div. 2d 765, 400 N.Y.S.2d 957 (4th Dep't 1977). Instances where guilty pleas can be withdrawn fall within three broad and overlapping categories. Westen & Westin, A Constitutional
Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REv. 471, 473 (1978). As stated by the
Court of Appeals: "a guilty plea induced by [a court's or prosecutor's] unfulfilled promise
either must be vacated or the promise honored." People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 241, 318
N.E.2d 784, 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 636 (1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (citing
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)); see, e.g., People v. Torres, 45 N.Y.2d 751, 380
N.E.2d 313, 408 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1978) (per curiam); Chaipis v. State Liquor Auth., 44 N.Y.2d
57, 375 N.E.2d 32, 404 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1978). A plea also may be withdrawn if it was coerced or
otherwise forced so that it no longer retains the "character of a voluntary act." Machibroda
v. United States, 386 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970); Adelstein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea:A Framework for Analysis, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv.
783, 823 (1978). Finally, the waiver of the constitutional right to trial must be made intelligently and not be the product of a misunderstanding or a misconception. See, e.g., McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
Additional guidelines for deciding plea withdrawal motions appear in ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS
OF GUILTY § 2.1 (1968).
" See, e.g., People v. Friedman, 39 N.Y.2d 463, 348 N.E.2d 883, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408
(1976); People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 310 N.E.2d 292, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1974);
People v. Maxwell, 61 App. Div. 2d 799, 402 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dep't 1978).
"I2See, e.g., People v. Maney, 37 N.Y.2d 229, 234, 333 N.E.2d 174, 176-77, 37.1 N.Y.S.2d
901, 904 (1975); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); People v. Lazore, 59 App. Div. 2d 635, 636, 398 N.Y.S.2d
189, 190 (3d Dep't 1977); People v. Parra, 57 App. Div. 2d 964, 965, 394 N.Y.S.2d 828, 828
(2d Dep't 1977); People v. Dombrowski, 49 App. Div. 2d 810, 811, 373 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (4th
Dep't 1975).
Plea bargaining, which accounts for approximately 90 percent of all criminal convictions,
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE: DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966);
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK

FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967), was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Prior to Santobello, plea negotiations were shrouded in
secrecy. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979). It has since
been accepted and generally is considered beneficial because dispositions are prompt and
usually final, the public is protected from those prone to criminal activity while released on
bail, it increases the possibility of rehabilitation, it allows for consideration of mitigating
circumstances during negotiations and upon sentencing, it reduces overcrowded court calendars, and it benefits all parties through the exchange of information for leniency. Santobello
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ally will not be accorded judicial recognition.'6 3 Reaffirming this
principle, the Court of Appeals, in People v. Frederick, 4 held that
a defendant is not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on a prejudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the court record is
devoid of any indication of an allegedly unfulfilled out-of-court
5
promise.'1
The defendant in Frederick was charged with criminal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs. 6"' Since Frederick claimed to have
information indicating corruption on the part of a police officer, the
prosecutor agreed to permit him to plead guilty to a less serious
crime and recommend a probationary sentence if the information
proved useful."' The trial record showed that, after the plea was
tendered, the judge carefully questioned the defendant to ascertain
whether he clearly understood that the court had made no promises
and was not obligated to follow any recommendation of the prosecutor."' Following several adjournments of sentencing, the defenv. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52
(1970)); see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227,
232-35, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788-89, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 628-29 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975); ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.3 (1968); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 350.3, commentary (1975). But see Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining,
62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976); Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining:A Proposal, 14 CRIM.
L. BULL. 101 (1978); Note, The Unconstitutionalityof PleaBargaining,83 HARV. L. REv. 1387
(1970). See also M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORSo, JUDGES
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 166 (1978); Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedureor A Third
"Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970); White, A Proposal for Reform of
the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 450 (1971).
10 See note 162 supra.
1" 45 N.Y.2d 520, 382 N.E.2d 1332, 410 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1978), aff'g 56 App. Div. 2d 619,
391 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 526, 382 N.E.2d at 1335, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
'6 Id. at 522, 382 N.E.2d at 1333, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57.
J, Id. at 522-23, 382 N.E.2d at 1333-34, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
'
Id. at 523-24, 382 N.E.2d at 1333-34, 410 N.Y.S:2d at 557. Before the plea was entered,
the following exchange took place between the court and the defendant:
THE COURT: Now as far as I am concerned, and as far as the District Attorney is concerned, well, I will first ask you this: Has the District Attorney or your
attorney indicated to you anything other than that I have the scope and I could
sentence you up to fifteen years? Have any promises been made to you beyond what
I have just said?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: I notice you turned to Mr. Zapp. I notice he said something to
you. I don't want to mislead you. I assume he didn't say anything contrary to what
I am saying . . . . [1)f you do receive a sentence up to a minimum of five years
and a maximum of fifteen, you have no cause for complaint and say that you want
to withdraw your plea because I will not allow it; do we understand each other?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
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dant's counsel allegedly requested an on-the-record assurance that
he would be able to withdraw the plea in the event the court failed
to follow the prosecutor's recommendation.16 9 The court purportedly
replied that there was no need to enter such a request on the record,
since the prosecutor's recommendation was always followed. 70 Prior
to sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw the plea. The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the motion and sentenced
7
Frederick despite the prosecutor's recommendation of probation.1 '
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously
72
affirmed the conviction.'
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. 7 3 Writing for the
Court, Judge Jasen noted that while there are no concrete rules
prescribing the extent of fact-finding for motions to withdraw pleas,
evidentiary hearings are rarely granted. 174 Moreover, unless a defendant can show that the plea was unfounded, 175 judges hearing such
motions may rely solely on the record in determining whether promises were made to the defendant. Thus, where a defendant's contentions are flatly contradicted by the record, "no judicial recognition
of defendant's averments will be forthcoming.' 1 76 Reaffirming its
decision in People v. Selikoff, 177the Frederick Court reasoned that
the crucial factor was the need for a high degree of finality accompanying guilty pleas. 17 According to the Court, this principle must be
"IId.

at 524, 382 N.E.2d at 1334, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 557-58.
170
Id. at 524, 382 N.E.2d at 1334, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
" 80 Misc. 2d 309, 362 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
172 56 App. Div. 2d 563, 391 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.).
"1 45 N.Y.2d at 520, 382 N.E.2d at 1332, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
,74Id. at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 1334, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 558; see People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d
926, 927, 324 N.E.2d 544, 544, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (1974) (per curiam). The trial-level judge
is granted broad discretion in determining the extent of the fact-finding procedures. Id.
"[O]ften, [however,] a limited interrogation by the court will suffice." Id.
175 45 N.Y.2d at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 1334, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 558. If the record shows that a
defendant misapprehended the nature of the charge or consequences of his plea, an evidentiary hearing should be granted to determine whether the plea was tendered intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily. E.g., People v. Beasley, 25 N.Y.2d 483, 487-88, 255 N.E.2d 239,
243, 307 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 (1969); People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 355, 234 N.E.2d 687, 69697, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 672 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969). See People v. Tinsley,
35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 324 N.E.2d 544, 544, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (1974) (per curiam); note 160
supra.
17'
45 N.Y.2d at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 1335, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 558; see note 160 supra.
' 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975). In Selikoff, the Court consolidated three appeals: People v. Davidson, 42 App. Div.
2d 957, 348 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1973) (mei.), People v. Selikoff, 41 App. Div. 2d 376,
343 N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't 1973), and People v. Campbell, 78 Misc. 2d 355, 356 N.Y.S.2d
476 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
"1 45 N.Y.2d at 526, 382 N.E.2d at 1335, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
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adhered to if the benefits of the plea bargaining system are to be
obtained." 9 Any agreements or understandings, therefore, should be
memorialized on the record. The Court maintained this procedure is consistent with the theory underlying the plea bargaining
system and will deter "indiscriminate potshots" from being taken
at the validity of plea negotiations. 80
It is submitted that the Frederick Court extended the reach of
the per se rule enunciated in Selikoff by applying the rule to motions
to withdraw pleas made before sentencing. Whereas one of the defendants in Selikoff claimed for the first time in a corum nobis
proceeding that an off-the-record agreement was reached, 8 ' the
motion in Frederick was made prior to sentencing. Thus, it appears
that the Court's unwillingness to disturb a trial court's denial of an
evidentiary hearing applies equally to pre-sentence and post-sent-

ence motions.'

When the dispute involves sentencing, however, it

would seem that different rules should apply to motions to withdraw
pleas and motions to vacate judgments. The necessity for "finality"
in plea bargaining appears most acute when a judgment is entered
as opposed to when a plea is tendered. Accordingly, a less stringent
standard for granting pre-sentencing evidentiary hearings would not
" Id.; see note 162 supra. As stated by the Supreme Court, the chief attributes of the
plea procedure-"speed, economy, and finality"-would be emasculated if the courts were
to allow indiscriminate hearings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). See generally
Erickson, The Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 Nom DAm LAw. 835 (1973). The Frederick
Court also rejected the defendant's contention that Allison mandated a different result. 45
N.Y.2d at 527, 382 N.E.2d at 1336, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 559. In Allison, the defendant maintained
that his guilty plea was based upon erroneous information from his attorney that he would
receive only a 10-year sentence. 431 U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a
determination whether an evidentiary hearing was required. Id. at 82-83. The FrederickCourt
distinguished Allison, noting that the "record" consisted of a standard printed form of 13
questions which, according to the Court, shed little light on the defendant's claim of a secret
agreement. 45 N.Y.2d at 527, 382 N.E.2d at 1336, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 560. Id. Indeed, the Allison
Court acknowledged that if the record were clearer, the defendant's "petition would have
been cast in a very different light." 431 U.S. at 79. Thus, it appears that there was nothing
on the record to indicate that Allison had an opportunity to present his claim of another
agreement.
"o 45 N.Y.2d at 525, 382 N.E.2d at 1335, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
181 People v. Davidson, 42 App. Div. 2d 957, 348 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dep't 1973) (mere.),
aff'd sub nom. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
28 In criminal proceedings, judgment is entered upon sentencing. CPL 1.20(15) (1971).
CPL 220.60(3) (Supp. 1978-1979) is applicable where the defendant seeks to withdraw his plea
prior to sentence. See note 159 supra. Postjudgment motions may be made pursuant to CPL
440.10 (1971) (to vacate judgement) and CPL 440.20 (1971) (to set aside sentence). Additionally, a state habeas corpus writ is available to a defendant as a last-resort civil remedy
within the New York judicial system and is brought in the county in which the defendant is
jailed. CPLR 7001-7012 (1963).
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promote an inordinate number of collateral attacks on judgments.'3
It is likely that pre-sentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas are
not made merely because the defendant is dissatisfied with the
sentence he expects to receive. Rather, it appears that the defendant
or his attorney believes that a plea arrangement will not be fulfilled."8 4 It is suggested, therefore, that trial-level courts should be
more willing to accord evidentiary hearings when a defendant requests withdrawal of his guilty plea before sentencing.'"
While the record in Frederick clearly indicates that the defendant was carefully questioned before he pleaded guilty, additional
safeguards may be developed to ensure that a defendant is not misled into believing that an out-of-court agreement would be binding.
Some jurisdictions have detailed such provisions by statute,18 and
it is suggested that New York enact similar legislation. By requiring
the judge who takes the plea to impress upon the defendant that
only plea arrangements placed on the record will be honored, 8s the
'1 As was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977),
to foster the successful operation of the plea bargaining process the tendered plea must be
granted a high degree of finality to ward off baseless collateral attacks. Id. at 72; see Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A collateral challenge to a
guilty plea differs from a direct appeal in that it attacks the integrity of the judgment in a
proceeding instituted independently of the action in which such judgment was rendered or
was or could be appealed. Edward Thompson Co. v. Thomas, 49 F.2d 500, 500-01 (D.C. Cir.
1931).
,"I In Frederick, the defendant's counsel apparently sought to withdraw the plea when
he realized that his expectations from the bargain he thought was struck did not coincide with
those of the court. 45 N.Y.2d at 520, 382 N.E.2d at 1334, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 558; see Barkai,
Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent
Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 90-94 (1977).
' It should be noted that even if a different standard was employed the defendant would
still have the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing. Note, Post-Conviction Challenges
to Guilty Plea Convictions: A Standard for Determining When an Evidentiary Hearing Is
Required, 16 AM. CraM. L. REV. 163 (1978). Judge Friendly has observed that collateral
recourse should be granted only where there is a "colorable" claim of innocence. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 160
(1970).
In E.g., GEN. STATS. N.C. § 15A-1022 (1978) (statutory framework requires that certain
specific questions be asked of the defendant); see ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 15-23 (1977); ABA
STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GuILTY (1968); ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art.
350 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
19 North Carolina's statute can serve as a model for questioning of a defendant at the
time of plea submittal. A more prophylactic procedure concerning questioning can serve the
twofold purpose of assuring that the defendant is cognizant of the consequences of his actions
and reducing those instances where a plea withdrawal will be permitted. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1022 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
(b) By inquiring of the prosecutor and defense counsel and the defendant
personally, the judge must determine whether there were any prior plea discussions,
land] whether the parties have entered into any arrangement with respect to the
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laudable goals of plea bargaining will be achieved, while preventing
a defendant from entering a guilty plea under any misconceptions.
Francis J. Coughlin, Jr.

Court of Appeals modifies Goggins standard for disclosure of informant's identity
The well-established prosecutor's privilege to withhold the
identity of a confidential informant188 often conflicts with a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process.189
In People v. Goggins,"'0 the Court of Appeals sought to resolve this
plea and the terms thereof. . . . The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no
contest from a defendant without first determining that the plea is a product of
informed choice.
's Although the privilege is often said to belong to the informant, it "is in reality the
Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law." Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The prosecutor's right to preserve the anonymity of
informants was created by the courts in the interest of public policy, independently of any
statutory or constitutional mandate. See Note, Disclosureof an Informant's Identity - The
Substantive and ProceduralBalance Tests, 39 ALB. L. REv. 561, 564 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Informant's Identity]. See generally Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
"I'See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957). See also United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Cannon, Prosecutor'sDuty to
Disclose, 52 MARQ. L. Rxv. 517 (1969); Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to DiscloseAfter United
States v. Agurs, 1977 U. OF ILL. L.F. 690, 690. The Roviaro Court held that the informant
privilege is overridden when "the dislcosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause. . . ." 353 U.S. at 60-61. This principle was to govern disclosure
in hearings to determine the existence of probable cause and in proceedings to establish the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Id.
New York cases initially indicated judicial reluctance to require disclosure of an informant's identity in probable cause cases. See People v. Cerrato, 24 N.Y.2d 1, 246 N.E.2d 501,
298 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 940 (1970); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d
86, 209 N.E.2d 694, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965). The privilege was less consistently applied,
however, where disclosure was relevant to the determination of guilt itself. Compare People
v. Casiel, 42 App. Div. 2d 762, 346 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2d Dep't 1973) with People v. Jones, 76
Misc. 2d 547, 350 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). See generally W. RIcHARDSON,
EVIDENCE § 456 (10th ed. 1973). The probable cause line of cases culminated with People v.
Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 313 N.E.2d 49, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1974), in which the Court of
Appeals ruled that where the evidence, apart from the potential testimony of the informant,
fails to establish probable cause, the judge should examine the informant in an in camera
hearing and provide the defense with a "summary report" of the testimony. Id. at 181, 313
N.E.2d at 52, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 586. On the same day that Darden was decided, the Court
also decided People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1012 (1974), in which guidelines were established to govern disclosure when the
defendant's guilt or innocence is in issue. See note 191 infra. Distinguishing Goggins from
cases involving a determination of probable cause, the Court concluded that the ex parte, in

